During these lulls, the LTTE was able to rest and refit while strengthening defenses and choosing the next target. Over the years, this pattern replayed several times as government offenses were stalled by the LTTE and cease-fires were declared. When the army columns were delayed by IEDs and obstacles, LTTE artillery and mortars were brought to bear with deadly accuracy. The LTTE used freedom of movement to infiltrate the flanks of these formations and then strike against the column in depth. The conventional tactics of advancing infantry formations along linear avenues of approach and seeking to penetrate fixed defenses proved to be a meat-grinder for the Sri Lankan army. Innovations in infantry training, organization, and employment - along with the efforts of all the armed forces - led to the government’s final victory in May 2009. The LTTE was once again poised to “combine guerilla warfare, positional defense, and IEDs (improvised explosive devices) to slow down and inflict heavy casualties by the extensive use of indirect fires.” 4 The Sri Lankan army, however, had also been preparing during the cease-fire. 3 Renewed terror attacks, natural disasters, and political changes weakened the cease-fire agreement, and the fourth and final Eelam War began in July 2006. They amassed artillery, created naval and air capabilities, and expanded a land force replete with dedicated and deadly suicide cadres. This long hiatus allowed the LTTE to transform from an insurgent force to a rebel army. International pressure once again led to a cease-fire which lasted five years. The LTTE consolidated territory and created a position of strength. 1 Then, by infiltration and maneuver, the LTTE would strike at weak points along the extended line of advance to great effect. This allowed the LTTE to concentrate defenses along a single axis of advance and stop the much larger force. During large-scale operations, the Sri Lankan army often advanced on narrow fronts to minimize movement and logistic difficulties. For six years, the Sri Lankan armed forces fought to stave off disaster and protect the Sri Lankan people. It was short lived, however, because of violations of the cease-fire, terror attacks, and changes in political will. International forces and domestic political realities led to another cease-fire in January 1995. During this time, the LTTE conducted terror acts and unconventional warfare throughout the island.

From these fixed positions, they used conventional formations and tactics, seeking to clear rebel-dominated areas.

The Sri Lankan army was locked into positional defense for the next five years of conflict. Fighting resumed between the LTTE rebels and the government of Sri Lanka in June 1990, marking the beginning of Eelam War II. The Indian army fought with the LTTE and established a peacekeeping effort which lasted until the withdrawal of the Indian army three years later in March 1990. The first cease-fire between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) began in July of 1987 and was followed by the Indian army intervention on the island. This initial outbreak set the tone for the long bloodletting to come. The Eelam War began in 1983 as the long-term tensions between the Singhalese and Tamil populations erupted with riots, killings, and government response. Background of Conflict: Cycle of Cease-fires Facing an impasse on the battlefield, leaders and men rethought their tactics and revived infantry fundamentals. They fought for many years against a separatist movement that had evolved into an insurgent state. The Sri Lankan army had just such an experience. How do you defeat a rebel army? An army that grew from the smallest insurgent cells, using terror as its prime tactic, to a fully manned force with artillery, an air wing, naval units, and elite suicide cadres? How do you remake yourself during a conflict in a way that leads from stalemate to victory? Look to the Infantry. Photos courtesy of Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence and Urban Development Sri Lankan special forces soldiers were experienced in both the conventional and unconventional aspects of infantry warfare.

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